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During the month of December 1943, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1st Cdn Div) 
underwent the most severe trial yet experienced 
by Canadian troops in Italy, when it crossed the 
Moro River, engaged two German divisions in 
rapid succession and, after a week of vicious 
street fighting, took the town of Ortona. Hailed at 
the time as victories, these battles have since been 
the subject of considerable debate among soldiers 
and historians alike. Much of the controversy 
has revolved around the division’s commander, 
Major-General Christopher Vokes, who has been 
accused by some of mishandling his formation, 
and has been castigated by others for the heavy 
cost in lives that resulted.1 Are these verdicts too 
harsh? Was he solely to blame for the manner in 
which the battles of the Moro River and Ortona 
evolved, and for their tragic cost? In order to 
better understand Chris Vokes’ actions during 
his first divisional battle, it will be argued that he 
did indeed make mistakes but at the same time 
was forced to deal with an extremely difficult 
set of circumstances that largely dictated the 
course and outcome of the battle. These included 
a strategic situation that created the conditions 
for a war of attrition; an unrealistic Army Group-
level plan; unfavourable terrain and weather; 
unexpected changes in German defensive tactics; 
the “fog of war”; and his own inexperience as a 
divisional commander. As a result Vokes faced 
the toughest challenge of his military career. 
 In May 1943 the Allies decided to expand 
their operations in the Mediterranean beyond the 
taking of Sicily by invading Italy.2 The objectives 
of this move were to knock Italy out of the war 
and force Germany to deploy a substantial force 
to protect its southern flank. This would aid the 
Soviets on the Eastern Front, and potentially 
stretch Germany’s military resources to the 
breaking point, especially following Operation 
Overlord, the forthcoming cross-Channel 
invasion of Europe. Despite these lofty goals, 
however, it would be a strictly limited effort. So 
as not to jeopardize the success of Overlord, it 
was agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 
the commitment in the Mediterranean would not 
be reinforced. Further, some seven divisions (four 
American and three British) would be readied for 
transfer back to Britain after 1 November 1943, 
along with some air assets.3 As a result of these 
decisions, the Italian theatre was deemed to be 
of secondary importance even before military 
operations commenced.
 The Allied strategic concept was not without 
risk, for it was possible to be too successful in 
tying down the Germans in Italy. It is considered 
axiomatic within military circles that in order 
to successfully attack a defended position, the 
attacking force should have at least three times 
the estimated combat power of the defenders.4 
The danger was that if the enemy fielded enough 
troops to make the ratio of attackers to defenders 
less than the desired three to one, the campaign 
could easily turn into a war of attrition. The rapid 
German response to the landing of General Sir 
Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army at the “toe” 
of the Italian boot on 3 September and that of 
the US Fifth Army at the Gulf of Salerno on 
the 9th seemed to point to just that result. The 
Germans immediately implemented Operation 
Axis, which directed Colonel-General Heinrich 
von Vietinghoff’s Tenth Army to disarm the Italian 
armed forces and concentrate in the Rome sector, 
while eight divisions from Field Marshal Erwin 
Rommel’s Army Group B occupied northern 
Italy.5 By the middle of September, the Germans 
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had committed some 
16 divisions. Within six 
weeks that number had 
grown to an estimated 
24, while those of the 
Allies numbered 11. 
Given the smaller size 
of German divisions 
(some were being re-
constituted) and that not 
all were engaged at once, 
the opposing armies in 
Italy were roughly equal. 
Allied air superiority 
notwithstanding, this 
helped set the stage for 
the bloody slogging match 
that would characterize 
the Italian campaign.6
 Decisions made at the 
theatre level also shaped 
the future Canadian 
battles. Rome was the 
next major objective, 
but taking it presented a 
significant problem for the 
Allied ground commander 
in Italy, General Sir 
H a r o l d  A l e x a n d e r, 
who commanded the 
1 5 t h  A r m y  G r o u p . 
Geographically separated 
b y  t h e  A p e n n i n e 
Mountains, the Eighth 
and Fifth Armies were 
operating practically 
independently of each 
other, with the former 
advancing in the centre 
and along the Adriatic 
coast while in the west 
the Americans were 
nearing Naples. Given 
the estimated German 
strength in Italy, it was 
clear that the Fifth Army lacked sufficient combat 
power to take Rome on its own, and so by 8 
November 1943 Headquarters 15th Army Group, 
with considerable input from Montgomery, 
produced a coordinated plan of attack that 
would involve both formations.7 The Eighth Army 
operation, code-named Encroach, was intended 
to begin on 20 November. Lieutenant-General 
Charles Allfrey’s V Corps 
would cross the Sangro 
River, drive north along 
the Adriatic coast to the 
town of Pescara and then 
use a lateral highway 
through the Apennines to 
approach the Eternal City 
from the east. Lieutenant-
General Miles Dempsey’s 
XIII Corps would mount 
a diversionary attack in 
the central region. At the 
same time, the Fifth Army 
would advance directly 
on Rome from the south 
along the Tyrrhenian 
coast. The combination 
of these assaults, it was 
believed, would compel 
the Germans to abandon 
the city.8 
     General Montgomery 
was optimistic about the 
forthcoming battle. On 25 
November, a few days after 
the Eighth Army attack 
had begun, he issued a 
personal message to his 
troops in which he boldly 
announced, “WE WILL 
NOW HIT THE GERMANS 
A COLOSSAL CRACK.”9 
But almost immediately 
it was apparent that the 
reality on the ground 
was vastly different. It 
took V Corps four days 
to force a crossing of 
the Sangro River, due to 
the combined effects of 
bad weather and fierce 
German resistance. This 
belated success came 
at the cost of heavy 
casualties, and by 1 December the lead British 
formation, the 78th Division, was so reduced 
in strength that it was of little further use in an 
attacking role.10 The war in Italy was proving 
to be one of attrition. With the Army still a 
long way from Pescara, Montgomery became 
increasingly worried that his “colossal crack” 
was degenerating into a colossal failure. In early 
Major-General Chris Vokes, general officer
commanding, 1st Canadian Infantry Division.
C
an
ad
ia
n 
Fo
rc
es
 J
oi
nt
 Im
ag
er
y 
C
en
tre
 Z
K
 8
44
 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/3
15
December, he wrote to General Sir Alan Brooke, 
the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), that “I am fighting a hell of a battle here…I 
don’t think we can get any spectacular results 
so long as it goes on raining.”11 Montgomery still 
had hopes of breathing new life into the offensive. 
First Cdn Div had been resting near the town of 
Campobasso throughout November, and was 
relatively fresh. Accordingly, on 27 November 
1943, the Canadians received a Warning Order 
from HQ V Corps to be prepared to relieve 78th 
Div along the Moro River.12 
 At this point in time, 1st Cdn Div had been 
in action as part of the Eighth Army for nearly 
five months, having joined that formation the 
previous July when, along with the 1st Canadian 
Armoured Brigade (1st CAB), it participated in 
Operation Husky, the Allied conquest of Sicily. 
Both formations had crossed over to Italy in 
September, gaining more battle experience. By 
November, the Canadians considered themselves 
veteran soldiers who “knew the score.” Despite 
this growing sense of confidence, however, some 
were uneasy about replacing 78th Division as 
the spearhead of V Corps’ assault. Farley Mowat, 
then the Intelligence Officer for the Hastings 
and Prince Edward Regiment (Hasty Pees), later 
recalled the disbelief that he and his Commanding 
Officer, Major Bert Kennedy, felt on being told at 
a divisional conference that the advance would 
be “plain sailing.” Both men believed that the 
weather and the enemy would reduce the rate of 
advance to a crawl.13 
 It is worth noting that at the time, Major-
General Chris Vokes, the division’s General 
Officer Commanding (GOC), seemed every bit as 
confident as Montgomery.14 Vokes, a Permanent 
Force officer, had risen quickly through the ranks 
and by the spring of 1942 he was a brigadier 
commanding the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade 
(2nd CIB).15 He earned “a certain reputation for 
success” in Sicily and on 1 November 1943, having 
already served as acting GOC of 1st Cdn Div for 
a few weeks while Major-General Simonds was 
sick with jaundice, he was promoted to the rank 
of major-general and formally given command of 
the division. Only 39 years old, this distinction 
came as a pleasant surprise, and it undoubtedly 
boosted his self-confidence.16 Vokes, moreover, 
was very confident in the abilities of his men, who 
had taken every objective assigned to them thus 
far. Finally, he believed that “it is [the] task [of] a 
commander to inspire their confidence and get 
the best out of them.”17 Chris Vokes was largely 
successful in doing so. Bert Hoffmeister, then the 
highly regarded commander of 2nd CIB, later 
said that Vokes was the only Canadian general 
under whom he served that had this ability. Many 
in 1st Cdn Div felt the same way.18 
 Vokes’ attitude may also have had something 
to do with his acceptance of the fact that although 
he was a divisional commander, he was still 
only one link in the Eighth Army chain of 
command, and as such he had to follow orders 
as much as any private soldier did.19 The chain 
of command, of course, was fundamental: it 
was how the military worked. In Italy, it was 
General Montgomery who determined how the 
Eighth Army’s battle would be fought, and he 
assigned tasks to his Corps commanders and 
they in turn to the divisional commanders who 
were responsible to execute Montgomery’s plan. 
If there were problems with a superior officer’s 
plan, and in the case of Operation Encroach the 
reliance on good weather to assure a speedy 
advance was certainly problematic, a subordinate 
officer had to be very careful about how to 
approach the subject. There is no evidence that 
Vokes questioned the plan20 and he dutifully 
carried it out.
 First Cdn Div began to relieve 78th Div on 1 
December, and by the following afternoon Vokes 
had assumed command of the new sector.21 
Initially, however, he had only two of his three 
infantry brigades. Third CIB, temporarily 
detached to XIII Corps, was delayed by a sudden 
washout of the British bridges over the Sangro 
and only rejoined the division on 6 December. 
Vokes did have the 4th British Armoured Brigade 
(4th BAB), which was replaced by 1st CAB on 7 
December. The total Canadian presence at the 
Moro eventually numbered nearly 26,500 officers 
and men.22 The battle began before his last two 
Canadian formations arrived. On 4 December, 
with the handover from 78th Division not quite 
complete, an urgent message was received at 
HQ 1st Cdn Div from Lieutenant-General Allfrey, 
telling Vokes that “[he] must get over RIVER 
MORO as soon as possible.”23 
 To Vokes it was clear that the ground, as 
much as the Germans, would dictate the manner 
in which much of the division’s battle would be 
fought. The whole sector was dotted with small 
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farms, with olive groves and vineyards covering 
the slopes of the numerous valleys and ravines. 
On the right flank were the Adriatic Sea and 
a new road called Highway 16 (which did not 
appear on the Canadian maps)24 that followed 
the coastline northeast across the Moro Valley in 
the direction of Ortona. The Moro River was just 
a small stream, nestled in a long, winding valley 
averaging 700 metres across and 100 metres 
deep. On the far side of the river, the ground rose 
gradually, culminating in a plateau about three 
kilometres away that was known as Vino Ridge. 
Almost immediately behind Vino Ridge was a 
deep ravine that ran in a generally northeast 
direction, roughly parallel to Highway 538 that 
connected the towns of Ortona and Orsogna. 
Some 180 metres across at its widest point, 180 
metres deep, and nearly five kilometres long, 
this feature gradually became shallower as it 
ran inland. The Canadians called it “the Gully.”25 
Just beyond the Gully, on a bluff overlooking 
the Adriatic, lay the town of Ortona, situated at 
the intersection of the new Highway 16 and the 
Ortona – Orsogna road. About five kilometres 
north of Ortona was the Arielli River, the next 
major natural feature. In the centre was a much 
older road, the original Highway 16, which 
snaked through the Moro Valley, climbed the far 
bank to the village of San Leonardo and wound 
its way to the northwest, crossing the Gully before 
it intersected with Highway 538. This important 
crossroads was given the code name “Cider.”26 
On the left of the divisional area there were few 
roads, but the terrain between the hamlet of Villa 
Rogatti, located on the Moro three kilometres 
upstream from San Leonardo, and Highway 538 
seemed to be passable for infantry and tanks. 
 The effect of weather on military operations 
was a crucial tactical consideration. Winter on 
the Adriatic coast brought a mix of rain, snow, 
and sleet, along with flash floods that turned the 
few roads and the surrounding countryside into 
a muddy quagmire. Even dismounted infantry 
found it difficult to move about the battlefield.27 
Additionally, the sky was frequently overcast, 
which prevented the Allied Desert Air Force from 
providing the high degree of close air support that 
the ground forces had come to expect. As a result 
air cover was spotty throughout the month. It is 
true that the Germans’ ability to conduct lateral 
movements, shift gun positions or to conduct 
re-supply operations were also affected. But, the 
effects of weather, combined with the nature of the 
ground, would more greatly hamper the attackers 
whose need for mobility was imperative. 
 Having surveyed the ground, Vokes developed 
his plan – a three-phase operation. First, the 
division would have to gain a bridgehead over 
the Moro River. Secondly, he would push forward 
to seize the “Cider” crossroads, which would 
cut Highway 538 and allow him to either bypass 
Ortona or proceed directly into town. The final 
phase would be the capture of Ortona itself. 
This would outflank the Germans’ positions 
at Orsogna and compel them to withdraw to 
their next likely line of defence along the Arielli 
River, as well as gain for the Eighth Army use of 
the town’s rail and port facilities for logistical 
purposes.28
 Chris Vokes immediately recognized that 
the need to construct Bailey bridges would be 
“a major limiting factor in [the division’s] rate of 
advance,” a fact that was especially true in the 
case of executing a successful crossing of the 
Moro River.29 The Moro’s steep banks made it 
an obstacle that tanks could not negotiate, and 
intimate tank support to the assaulting infantry 
was crucial if the crossing was to succeed, 
especially if the Germans counterattacked with 
their own armour.30 To get the tanks across would 
require a strong bridge, and as the Germans had 
already destroyed the few bridges in the area, the 
Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE) would have to 
build one, using the Bailey assault bridging kits. 
A Bailey bridge could not be built just anywhere 
and so practically the first thing that Vokes did 
upon assuming command of the sector was to 
order his units to find potential crossings with 
suitable bridging sites.31
 Viable approach routes to the “Cider” 
crossroads were essential once the river crossing 
had been completed. This requirement was based 
on two key considerations. First, advancing 
troops required sufficient space to manoeuvre. 
Secondly, while tanks and infantry could go 
cross-country, the division depended on the daily 
delivery of tons of ammunition, fuel, and food in 
the heavy trucks operated by the Royal Canadian 
Army Service Corps in order to keep fighting, 
and the trucks needed roads. Although the 1st 
Canadian Divisional Mule Transporter Company 
had been established in Sicily to support 
4
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dismounted infantry in mountainous terrain,32 
the amount that the mules could actually carry 
was limited. The mules could only augment, not 
replace, wheeled transport.
 Vokes decided to make his main effort in 
the centre near San Leonardo, which seemed 
to offer the most advantages. He ordered two 
diversionary assaults to be made as well, one at 
Villa Rogatti and another just inland from the 
coast. These operations began on 5 December. 
Brigadier Hoffmeister’s 2nd CIB was assigned 
the main role in the operation. The Seaforth 
Highlanders of Canada launched the main assault 
at San Leonardo while the diversionary attack 
at Villa Rogatti was conducted by the Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). The 
coastal diversion was mounted by 1st CIB’s Hasty 
Pees.33 Determined German opposition stopped 
the main attack by the Seaforths cold, and the 
supporting tanks were unable to cross the river 
to assist. The diversionary crossings proved to 
be more successful, with the PPCLI bridgehead 
offering a glittering opportunity to outflank the 
enemy stronghold in San Leonardo and also the 
town of Ortona. For this reason, Hoffmeister 
asked Vokes on 6 December for permission to 
stop the assault at San Leonardo and reinforce the 
Patricias.34 Vokes agreed, ordering Hoffmeister to 
commit another battalion. That unit, the Loyal 
Edmonton Regiment, had only begun to move 
towards Villa Rogatti when it received orders 
cancelling the operation. The next day, the PPCLI 
was ordered to hand over the hamlet to the 8th 
Indian Division (8 Ind Div).35 
 Historian Michael Cessford has criticized this 
move, saying that Vokes discounted the potential 
offered by the PPCLI bridgehead:36 Vokes’ orders 
to Hoffmeister, however, clearly indicate that 
such was not the case. In fact, the change in plan 
derived from two factors, both of which could be 
ascribed to “the fog of war.” The first revolved 
around the viability of a bridging site at Villa 
Rogatti. As the 2nd CIB war diarist recorded, “an 
engineer recce [reconnaissance] carried out by 
3rd Fd Coy RCE [3rd Field Company] reported 
that it was impossible to build a bridge over 
the river owing to the great difference in height 
between the near and far banks.”37 This meant 
that sustaining an expanded bridgehead was out 
of the question. Unfortunately, this assessment 
was quickly proven to be incorrect, for just three 
days later engineers from 8 Ind Div, specifically 
69 Fd Coy of the Bengal Sappers, erected a Bailey 
bridge at the very location that the Canadians had 
just rejected.38 Apparently, 3rd Fd Coy had only 
looked at constructing a bridge from the near 
An aerial view of the Canadian artillery barrage which preceeded the attack
on the Moro River by 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 8 December 1943.
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bank of the Moro which was the normal practice. 
The Bengal Sappers, however, built the bridge in 
reverse by manhandling every piece of the Bailey 
bridge assembly to the far shore in order to build 
the bridge from the higher bank.39 Justifiably 
proud of their accomplishment, the Indians 
named the new structure “Impossible Bridge.” 
Vokes, who had joined the Permanent Force as 
an RCE officer, later commented, “I can tell you 
I was in an evil temper when I learned about 
this, but by then it was far too late.”40 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the war diaries of both 3rd Fd 
Coy and the divisional Engineer staff are silent 
regarding their decisions at Villa Rogatti.41
 Secondly, Lieutenant-General Allfrey thought 
1st Cdn Div had failed to force a crossing of the 
Moro due to an insufficient concentration of force, 
rather than the combination of vigorous German 
opposition and poor mobility resulting from the 
effects of the rough terrain and bad weather.42 
The corps commander therefore reduced the 
division’s frontage, believing that this would 
solve the problem and allow Vokes to press on 
quickly. The division’s new left boundary followed 
a path roughly half-way between San Leonardo 
and Villa Rogatti paralleling old Highway 16 
through to Highway 538, and then onward to 
Villa Grande, located about four kilometres 
southwest of Ortona. To Vokes, this line was as 
real as a barbed wire fence, for it delineated his 
responsibility for terrain and allowed him to 
plan operations without conflicting with those of 
flanking formations.43 The boundary shift placed 
Villa Rogatti outside of his assigned area. 
 In the short term, Vokes was forced to adjust 
his plan yet again, with the intention now being 
to use his remaining toehold on the enemy side 
of the Moro, tenuously held by the Hasty Pees, 
to break out and, striking laterally across the 
front of the German defences, attempt to take 
San Leonardo. At the same time, the village was 
to be assaulted frontally. This risky and costly 
operation began on 7 December and prompted 
The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) to call the 
ridge “Slaughterhouse Hill.”44 Not until the night 
of 9 December was 1st Cdn Div fully across the 
Moro River.
 The long-term effects were much more 
significant. The loss of the PPCLI bridgehead 
“cost the 1st Division a real opportunity to 
penetrate the German defences.”45 This view was 
reinforced by the Canadian official history which 
pointed out that “instead of outflanking San 
Leonardo from the left and then advancing along 
the grain of the country the Canadians were now 
to become involved in a series of costly frontal 
assaults in which advantages of topography 
lay with the defenders.”46 It meant that the 
Gully, where some of the bloodiest fighting the 
Canadians were to experience in the war would 
occur, lay squarely in the path of the Canadian 
advance. Only a small gap, perhaps 750 metres 
across, remained between its southwestern edge 
and the new left boundary, through which troops 
could be funnelled into more open terrain.
 At this stage it would be useful to examine 
the German side of the story, for it was as much 
their actions as the effects of higher-level Allied 
planning and the harsh environmental factors 
that influenced the upcoming battle. On 1 
October, General von Vietinghoff, commander 
of the Tenth Army, sent a signal to the 14th 
and 76th Corps saying “The Fuehrer considers 
it as most important to cede as little ground 
as possible. This applies especially to the left 
[Adriatic] wing of the Army. A forceful conduct 
of the defensive operations will be attempted.”48 
In compliance with these orders, the Germans 
began to develop a series of defensive lines 
spanning the width of Italy; the first of these was 
the Bernhard Line, which on the Adriatic front 
was based on the Sangro River. One month later, 
Marshal Kesselring issued his “Order for the 
Conduct of the Campaign,” in which he directed 
von Vietinghoff to “decisively defend the Bernhard 
position…Construction…must be continued by 
night and by day and…be improved ceaselessly. 
The object is to create an impregnable system of 
positions in depth…”49 It was this type of linear 
defence system that the British and Canadians 
confronted in early December 1943.
 The Germans were not fooled by Montgomery’s 
attempt to use XIII Corps to divert their attention 
away from the Adriatic. It was obvious to 
Kesselring that the only place the Eighth Army 
could hope to achieve any significant results 
would be along the Adriatic coast, and in the event 
of a coordinated attack involving the Fifth Army 
to take Rome, it was equally evident that the key 
to frustrating the Allied plan would be to hold 
the British.50 Further, the enemy had learned to 
recognize the signs of an impending Eighth Army 
offensive. At 1710 hours on 18 November, von 
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Vietinghoff cabled Kesselring, “The concentration 
of Eighth Army on the Adriatic front leads 10 
Army to expect an early attack on our left wing;” 
almost immediately, the sector was reinforced 
with three additional divisions.51 Thus, when 
Operation Encroach began in the latter half of 
November 1943, the Germans were ready, and 
there was virtually no chance of the Allies, or the 
Canadians, catching them unawares.
 Within the Canadian sector, the 90th Panzer 
Grenadier Division (90th Pz Gren Div) took 
over from the worn-out 65th Infantry Division 
on 2 December. Its appreciation of the tactical 
situation deduced the objectives that an attacker 
would want to seize, and, using the terrain to 
best advantage, developed a defensive plan. The 
Germans dug in as they were conditioned by the 
consistent use of massed artillery and air power 
by the Allies to support ground operations.52 
In particular, the Germans made good use of 
“reverse slope” positions, which meant that they 
dug into the lower portion of both slopes of the 
various gullies and valleys. This tactic protected 
the defenders from artillery and air attack, gave 
them the ability to ambush any attacking force 
breaking the ridgelines, and concealed them from 
dismounted reconnaissance patrols.53 By the 
time 1st Cdn Div arrived at the Moro River, the 
Germans were covering the most likely avenues 
of approach in well dug-in positions.
 Both Alexander and Montgomery knew of the 
Germans’ intentions almost immediately, having 
received high-priority Ultra decrypts from British 
Intelligence.54 Vokes and his divisional staff, 
on the other hand, were not so well informed, 
although they were aware that the enemy had been 
preparing reverse slope positions in the area.55 
The explanation for what might seem a serious 
communication failure was simple. Intelligence 
gained through Ultra was very highly classified 
and was distributed only to a select number of 
Allied commanders. As one of the few officers 
privy to the Ultra secret, Montgomery could not 
do or say anything that might risk exposing its 
existence.56 There is no evidence that he warned 
his divisional commanders of the changed enemy 
plans, for indeed the various intelligence staffs 
within 1st Cdn Div continued to assume that 
the enemy would act in the way they had always 
done. As the 2nd CIB intelligence officer, Captain 
F.N. Pope, noted on 10 October, “The enemy 
continues to withdraw slowly but surely along the 
whole Allied front, and it is doubtful whether this 
withdrawal will slow down unless KESSELRING 
receives reinforcements.”57 
 The stiff resistance encountered by the British 
at the Sangro at the end of November seems to 
have provided the first real indication that the 
enemy’s defensive approach had changed. But, 
as the Canadian division’s intelligence summaries 
The impact of the fierce fighting to cross the Moro River can be seen in this series of photos taken in San Leonardo on 
10 December 1943. Left: The stress of combat is evident on the faces of these soldiers from the Edmonton Regiment. 
Right: Major Roy C.H. Durnford, a chaplain, conducts a burial service. Some of the men wear helmets due to the heavy 
shelling still occurring in the area.
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and the Brigade war diaries clearly indicate, it 
was realized only gradually that the Germans 
intended to stand and fight. As Major N.L.C. 
Mathers, a divisional intelligence staff officer, 
wrote on 7 December:
We have assumed that the enemy will fight his 
force with determination until it is clear that we 
have succeeded in seizing a brhd [bridgehead] 
which allows the full employment of all our arms 
and have sup [supply] routes which wipe out the 
river as a tactical feature. When he judges that 
point has been reached he will begin withdrawal 
to a new line. It appears that the enemy does not 
think that point has as yet been reached.58 
A week later, on 14 December, the war diarist of 
2nd CIB noted: 
The enemy picture has now become somewhat 
clearer…It is apparent that having committed 
all available tps [troops] of 90th PG [Panzer 
Grenadier] Div including the Recce Unit, Engrs 
[Engineers], and the “Kitchen Sink.” [sic] He 
has now given depth to his def [defence] by 
reinforcing them with the [3rd] Para Regt and 
withdrawing certain elements of the 90th PG Div 
from the fwd [forward] posns [positions].59 
It was not until 16 December 1943, during the 
battle for the Gully, that the divisional intelligence 
staff finally concluded that “no longer was the 
German executing a fighting withdrawal: he was 
resolved, cost what it might, to prevent an adv 
[advance] across the MORO River.”60 Eleven days 
later, 1st Cdn Div Intelligence Summary No. 31 
repeated this gloomy assessment, noting “the 
unique concentration of 1 Para Div as a force 
betrays the resolution of the Germans to defeat 
our attacks along the coast if they possibly can. 
There are no better German tps [troops] in this 
theatre than our present enemy.”61 It would seem 
evident that it was the Canadians who were 
surprised at the Moro, not the Germans.
 Vokes had “little scope for finesse” due to 
the lack of surprise, the enemy’s domination of 
the most likely approaches, the limitations on 
manoeuvre resulting from Lieutenant-General 
Allfrey’s boundary shift, and the soggy terrain.62 
Nowhere was this more in evidence than during 
the bloody slogging match that occurred in 
front of the Gully. Spanning virtually the entire 
breadth of 1st Cdn Div’s sector and blocking all 
access to the “Cider” crossroads, the Gully was 
representative of the Germans’ skill in defensive 
operations. It was both a reverse slope position 
and a natural tank obstacle. Covered in well-
developed vineyards and olive groves, the German 
defences were further enhanced by a liberal use 
of both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. 
Initially manned by a battalion of the 90th Pz 
Gren Div, this battle-depleted unit was replaced 
on 12 December by the 3rd Parachute Regiment 
(3rd Para Regt), part of the elite 1st Parachute 
Division (1st Para Div), which positioned one 
battalion near Casa Berardi at the south-western 
end of the Gully and another immediately in front 
of “Cider.”63 Clearly, the Germans intended to use 
the Gully to stop the Canadian advance, and it 
proved to be a very tough nut for 1st Cdn Div to 
crack. 
 The fight for the Gully was one of the most 
controversial aspects of Vokes’ handling of 
the battles of December 1943. There were two 
possible courses of action open to him – blast 
through it or go around it. Initially Vokes chose 
the first option, a decision that the late historian 
Brereton Greenhous derided as being that of 
someone who was not “a moderately clever 
general.”64 Greenhous, however, ignored the fact 
that virtually nothing was known about the Gully 
beforehand. On the Canadian maps this feature 
appeared as little more than a thin line and was 
seen as just another minor obstacle.65 Although 
Vokes knew that the Germans were using reverse 
slope positions, there was no reason to believe 
that this particular one had been transformed into 
a main defensive position, and thus it appears 
that he did not order a thorough reconnaissance 
of the ground beyond the Moro prior to his troops 
moving out from the bridgehead at San Leonardo. 
This was contrary to the normal Eighth Army 
practice. When the Loyal Edmonton Regiment 
“bumped” into the Gully on 10 December on 
its way to the “Cider” crossroads, Vokes’ main 
objective, the resulting storm of gunfire came as 
a rude shock.66
 Doug Delaney has convincingly argued that 
the failure of 2nd CIB’s initial attack at the Gully 
was a product of haste.67 It is a crucial point, 
for the success of Operation Encroach hinged 
on preventing the Germans from deploying 
their reserves in time to block the attack, which 
meant that the attackers had to move swiftly. 
Of course, the combined effects of the rugged 
terrain, adverse weather, and the German 
decision to stand and fight made achieving a 
rapid advance virtually impossible, but that did 
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not stop Montgomery from demanding that his 
subordinates pick up the pace, an effect which 
rippled down the line – “Montgomery harried 
Allfrey; Allfrey harried Vokes; and Vokes harried 
Hoffmeister into attacking without the benefit of 
extensive reconnaissance.”68 For the Canadians 
at the Moro, the old military adage that “time 
spent on recce is seldom wasted” was thus 
rapidly revised to “time spent on recce is seldom.” 
This new reality affected all levels of military 
operations. Farley Mowat, then the Hasty Pee 
intelligence officer, remembered that he was given 
only one hour on 5 December to find a crossing 
site over the Moro, while Strome Galloway, an 
RCR company commander, later noted that he 
had “about two minutes to memorize the features 
on the [air] photo” prior to his unit’s ill-fated 
attack across the front of the German lines on 
the 7th.69 
 Chris Vokes operated under similar 
constraints. The Army commander even used one 
of his liaison officers, Canadian Major Richard 
Malone, to apply the pressure: 
Sometimes, partly to kid Chris Vokes and also 
have him press ahead, Monty would have me 
ask Chris why the 1st Division didn’t straighten 
out their front line a bit in the mountains. What 
was delaying him? This would enrage Chris, 
who would roar at me through his great red 
moustache. “You tell Monty if he would get the 
hell up here and see the bloody mud he has 
stuck us in, he’d know damn well why we can’t 
move faster.”70 
Operating within this type of command 
environment, and believing that the Gully was just 
another small obstacle of little consequence, it 
seems unlikely that Vokes would have requested a 
delay to allow time for a detailed reconnaissance. 
It seems equally improbable that either Allfrey or 
Montgomery would have approved. Vokes’ initial 
failure to appreciate the strength of the enemy 
position at the Gully might be excused. 
 Mark Zuehlke’s charge that Vokes mishandled 
his division during this stage of the fighting 
largely stemmed from the fact that after 2nd 
CIB’s failure on 10 December, he continued to 
hammer away at the Gully, frequently committing 
a battalion instead of a brigade. It made little 
tactical sense, for as the regimental history of 
the Loyal Edmonton Regiment wryly put it, “The 
line of advance manifestly was not across The 
Gully.”71 And yet, that was precisely what was 
attempted. During the next nine days, a total of 
eight attacks at the battalion level or higher were 
thrown headlong at the Gully. Each attack failed 
miserably, and casualties mounted.72 
 Chris Vokes later said that his intention was 
to use feint attacks in order to wear the enemy 
down, having noticed the Germans’ tendency 
to mount immediate counter-attacks after a 
Canadian action. This justification, however, has 
never been very satisfactory, for it does not appear 
to be substantiated by corroborating evidence.73 
There are several other possible explanations. At 
this stage of the battle it was assumed that the 
enemy would defend briefly and then withdraw to 
their next holding position. It may have seemed 
to Vokes that “just one more try” would convince 
the Germans to do what they were “supposed” to 
do. Also, the small gap between the south-western 
end of the Gully and the division’s left boundary, 
a product of the reduced divisional frontage, may 
have been seen as just enough of a choke point 
that the idea of using it to outflank the Germans 
was not an obvious solution to the problem. In 
this regard, there appears to be no evidence that 
1st Cdn Div ever requested a re-adjustment of 
the boundary. Vokes simply “got on with it.”74 
 Vokes was new to his job as divisional 
commander, which may help to explain his 
piecemeal commitment of his battalions at the 
Gully. Further, Vokes at this stage in his career 
tended to allow his brigadiers to conduct their 
own operations, rather than compelling them to 
conform to a divisional plan.75 Chris Vokes later 
justified this approach, saying that he initially 
believed “commanding the division could be 
rather difficult...because I wouldn’t be able to 
impose my will on the brigade commanders, 
so recently my peers…I decided I would use as 
much tact as possible and handle them with kid 
gloves.”76 Simply put, he needed to learn how to 
do his new job. This was not unusual, as Field 
Marshal Montgomery wrote in his memoirs:
It is sometimes thought that when an officer 
is promoted to the next higher command, he 
needs no teaching in how to handle it. This is a 
great mistake. There is a tremendous difference 
between a brigade and a division…; when an 
officer got promotion, he needed help and advice 
in his new job and it was up to me to see that 
he got it.77
 Montgomery makes an excellent point, 
one that has often been overlooked by those 
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unfamiliar with the complexities of battlefield 
command. Viewed from this perspective, it 
seems logical that Vokes’ newness to divisional 
command meant that he was bound to make 
mistakes, and committing his battalions in a 
piecemeal fashion was certainly one. Some of 
Vokes’ critics also seem to have forgotten that he 
was not the first Canadian general to do this. At 
the battle of Nissoria in Sicily, his predecessor as 
GOC 1st Cdn Div, Major-General Guy Simonds, 
had committed exactly the same error, with 
similar results. Montgomery recognized this as 
inexperience, and rather than firing him he taught 
the Canadian how to lead his division. Simonds 
went on to command II Canadian Corps and is 
generally regarded by historians and soldiers 
alike as the best field general Canada produced 
during the war. If Simonds needed time to adjust 
to his new responsibilities, so too did Vokes.78
 Ultimately, it was by using the small gap 
at the southwestern end of the Gully that the 
stalemate was finally broken. On 14 December, 
“C” Company of the Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR, 
also known as “the Van Doos”), accompanied 
by tanks of the Ontario Regiment, advanced 
and took Casa Berardi, a house beside the 
Ortona–Orsogna road. From this position the 
Canadians could fire at the backs of the Germans 
in the Gully, who reacted by launching repeated 
counterattacks.79 Vokes reinforced the success 
gained by the Van Doos, and subsequent attacks 
eventually resulted in the seizure of the “Cider” 
crossroads, which forced the enemy to abandon 
the Gully, opening the road to Ortona. The R22eR 
company commander at Casa Berardi, Captain 
Paul Triquet, was later awarded the Victoria 
Cross for his leadership.
 The tactical problem that Vokes would face 
in Ortona was entirely different from that of 
the Gully. Fighting in a built-up area involved 
close-quarter combat. The distance between 
combatants was often measured in feet and 
the infantry could not rely on the usual range 
of fire support provided by artillery or aircraft. 
Similarly, while tanks could blast entry holes 
into buildings, they were very vulnerable to 
destruction. The German defenders, comprising 
two battalions of 1st Para Div plus elements of 
the 1st Parachute Combat Engineer Battalion, 
were fully aware of this, and had begun their 
preparations a few days before the Canadians 
entered the town. They demolished buildings, 
which offered them innumerable, well-concealed 
firing positions, and used the narrow, rubble-
choked streets to channel their opponents into 
pre-designated killing zones.80 The result was a 
defender’s dream, and an attacker’s nightmare. 
As Chris Vokes later said, “Everything before 
Ortona was a nursery tale.”81
 The vicious street fighting in Ortona, 
remembered by many Canadians as “the 
Christmas battle,” has captured the attention of 
historians and the public alike. Vokes’ decision 
The Gully was finally captured by the 
Canadians after Major Paul Triquet (Above) 
led a company from the Royal 22nd Régiment 
to capture and hold Casa Beradi, eventually 
forcing a German withdrawal to Ortona.
Left: Casa Beradi, Southern Exposure, by 
Charles Comfort 
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to push the Loyal Edmonton Regiment and 
the Seaforth Highlanders into the town on 20 
December has been severely criticized. After all, 
towns were typically bypassed because fighting in 
such an environment could slow down an army’s 
rate of advance. Brereton Greenhous, no admirer 
of Vokes, has argued that this was what should 
have happened. According to him, the reason that 
it did not was that “in a very humdrum way, taking 
Ortona itself was the next logical step; Ortona, 
after all, was the immediate, direct objective, 
and to push on north required a small leap of 
logic.”82 Some veterans have agreed. Jim Stone, 
a major with the Loyal Edmonton Regiment who 
distinguished himself in the street fighting, later 
said, “Ortona was a frightfully-fought battle. It 
should never have been fought.”83 
 From the vantage point of hindsight, Ortona 
probably should have been bypassed entirely but, 
at the time, no one on the Allied side, let alone 
Chris Vokes or his staff, had any inkling that the 
Germans would stand and fight. They expected 
a staged withdrawal to the Arielli River, the next 
natural obstacle.84 It was possible that they might 
put up a brief fight in Ortona, a scenario that 
had occurred several times before in Italy. After 
the experience of the previous two weeks of hard 
fighting at and beyond the Moro River, such a view 
may seem incredible to a modern-day observer. 
However, the simple fact was that nowhere in the 
Allied experience in the Mediterranean had there 
ever been an instance in which the Germans had 
fought a protracted urban battle.85 As Hoffmeister, 
who was given the task of taking the town, later 
said “I never questioned it at the time. I was given 
my orders and we got on with it.”86 
 The Germans were also surprised at how the 
battle for Ortona developed. On 25 December 
Field Marshal Kesselring discussed the matter 
on the telephone with Colonel-General Joachim 
Lemelsen, acting commander of Tenth Army, 
saying that “It is clear that we do not want to 
defend Ortona decisively but the English have 
made it appear as important as Rome…you can 
do nothing when things develop in this manner; 
it is only too bad that…the world press makes 
so much of [it].”87 Kesselring was correct in 
noting that the media spotlight had shifted to the 
Adriatic front. On 22 December, an Associated 
Press reporter described Ortona as a “miniature 
Stalingrad,” an image that was immediately seized 
upon: in Canada, practically every newspaper in 
the country provided daily coverage, while CBC 
radio correspondent Matthew Halton offered 
several gripping frontline reports.88 With this type 
of attention, Ortona became “a prestige battle,” 
one that neither side was willing to abandon. It 
was a powerful indication of how the media could 
influence the conduct of military operations. 
 It is sometimes overlooked that at the same 
time that the street fighting in Ortona was going 
on, Vokes was pushing the bulk of his division 
– both the 1st and 3rd Brigades – north and west 
of the town to cut off the coastal highway, thereby 
forcing the Germans to withdraw. One could 
reasonably argue that this operation was Vokes’ 
main effort, and that perhaps he did make that 
“small leap of logic” Greenhous referred to.89 This 
outflanking move through soggy terrain was also 
hotly contested by 1st Para Div and the rate of 
advance was very slow. While Vokes undoubtedly 
had to focus on this fight, he still kept his eye 
on the 2nd Brigade. Increasingly worried about 
its mounting casualties – Major Stone’s rifle 
company was reduced to 18 men by the end of 
the week90 – Vokes visited Hoffmeister on “about 
day four or five” to discuss breaking off the battle. 
Hoffmeister later recalled that,
I could see light at the end of the tunnel. Chris 
Vokes asked me if I would like to quit and I 
said, “absolutely not, to quit at this time would 
be letting the brigade down and the effect on the 
morale of the brigade would be such that it would 
be just shocking.” Furthermore the objective 
was represented to me as being extremely 
important, one that Eighth Army just must 
have, and I said nothing has changed as far as 
2nd Brigade is concerned[;] we’ll see it through, 
which we did.91 
 Vokes accepted this argument, and 2nd CIB 
continued to fight its way through the town. By 
28 December the rest of 1st Cdn Div was close 
enough to Highway 16 to directly threaten its 
continued use by the Germans, who withdrew 
from Ortona the same day. Shortly afterward, 
in early January 1944, the Eighth Army attack 
finally petered out due to the combined effects of 
poor weather and heavy losses. The Canadians’ 
ordeal at the Moro River and Ortona was over.
* * * * *
Since December 1943, there has been considerable debate regarding what was 
actually gained during the battles of the Moro 
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River and Ortona. The Canadian official history 
has recorded them as costly successes, while 
Vokes reported to his superiors that, “We smashed 
the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division and we gave 
the 1st German Parachute Division a mauling 
which it will long remember.”92 On the other 
hand, Ortona’s port facility turned out to be more 
or less useless for the purpose of military logistics 
due to its small size and limited infrastructure.93 
More significantly, after abandoning Ortona the 
Germans simply withdrew as they had been 
expected to, and occupied a new line of defence 
along the Arielli River. The Adriatic front quickly 
settled into a state of static warfare, with little 
movement before the Canadians left in the spring 
of 1944 to participate in an attack at the Liri 
Valley. From this viewpoint, the ground that had 
been won at such high cost appeared to provide 
the Allies with little real advantage. 
 For the veterans and the families of those who 
died, the appalling human cost of these battles 
has been the greatest cause for criticism. The 
casualty figures tell the grim story. In September, 
1st Cdn Div’s battle casualties had been 69 all 
ranks.94 In December this figure skyrocketed to a 
staggering 3,956 officers and men – 2,339 killed, 
wounded or missing, and another 1,617 listed as 
either sick or suffering from neuro-psychiatric 
disorders.95 The rifle companies in the Division’s 
nine infantry battalions, which seldom had a total 
fighting strength exceeding 3,600 men, suffered 
the most. Many lost 50 percent or more of their 
men, including a high percentage of platoon or 
section commanders. Even after having received 
some 2,408 replacements, 1st Cdn Div was still 
short 1,050 officers and men by early January 
1944. Vokes believed the situation was so serious 
that he reported to Allfrey “in my opinion, 
the infantry units of this division will not be 
in fit condition to undertake further offensive 
operations until they have had a period of rest, 
free of operational commitments.”96 
 Chris Vokes was nicknamed “The Butcher” 
after Ortona by some of his troops indicating 
that they held him personally responsible for the 
high casualty rate.97 Of all the criticisms that have 
been levied against him, this is perhaps the most 
unfair, for he was not entirely to blame. After all, 
the rough parity in fighting strength between the 
Allies and the Germans ensured that the Italian 
campaign would be a war of attrition even before 
it began. As well, the Germans, unlike Vokes, 
Top: At the end of a slugging match a Canadian Sherman, probably 
from the Three Rivers Regiment, rumbles into the main square 
of Ortona. The fury of the fighting can be seen by the wrecked 
buildings.
Middle: Canadian troops move a 6-pounder anti-tank gun into position 
during the street fighting in Ortona, 21 December 1943.
Bottom: A column of troops from the Edmonton Regiment move up 
a street, supported by a tank, Ortona, 23 December 1943.
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were able to replace their battle-depleted units 
with fresh, veteran units – 90th Pz Gren Div 
was relieved by 1st Para Div on 12 December. 
Moreover, the Allies were trying to break through 
a main defensive position held by a highly skilled 
opposing force determined to contest every 
inch, and in the worst possible conditions. This 
situation was exacerbated by the slow arrival of 
replacements, many of which were insufficiently 
trained for front-line service and quickly became 
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casualties themselves. Under such adverse 
circumstances, heavy casualties were inevitable. 
In fact, losses in the rest of the Army in December 
were comparable to those sustained by the 
Canadians, but only Vokes’ troops had achieved 
anything resembling success.98 Finally, contrary 
to what some of his men thought, Vokes himself 
was deeply affected by the high price his men 
paid. This was at least partly in evidence when he 
offered to call the battle off in Ortona. However, a 
more poignant indicator was related by a former 
1st Cdn Div staff officer. One night during that 
terrible December he had discovered “Chris 
Vokes…having dinner all by himself in his own 
headquarters, and he was crying. There was only 
one reason he was weeping – he realized what 
[his] men were going through.”99 
 A batt lef ie ld commander bears the 
responsibility for both success and failure: such 
is the price of command. Yet, when examining 
how battles are conducted, especially after 
the fact, it is sometimes easy to forget that 
commanders, despite their professional training, 
are still human beings who make mistakes. There 
is no question that during the battles of the Moro 
River and for Ortona, Major-General Christopher 
Vokes committed some errors of judgement. At 
the same time one cannot divorce the decision-
making process from the context within which 
decisions are made, and thus any criticism of 
his generalship must be tempered by an attempt 
to understand that context. In his first major 
engagement as a divisional commander, Chris 
Vokes was forced to fight a battle of attrition 
against some of the best soldiers in the world, 
in terrain and weather conditions that heavily 
favoured the defenders. At the same time, the 
limitations on his freedom of action resulting 
from the unfortunate loss of the Villa Rogatti 
bridgehead and the simultaneous reduction of 
his division’s frontage, combined with an equally 
unanticipated change in enemy defensive tactics, 
set the stage for the events at the Gully and in 
Ortona itself. All of these elements shaped the 
battle that Vokes had to direct. In the end, he 
could only do his best. Given the context, his best 
was good enough. 
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